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Foreword
As we contemplate a new industrial strategy for Britain in the wake of the worst recession in over 
70 years, it is clear that this must be informed by the experiences of previous policy initiatives. 
In looking at the effectiveness of government-backed venture capital schemes over the past ten 
years, this report does exactly that and therefore comes at an opportune time for those interested 
in fashioning a more innovative, forward-looking Britain.
Venture capital has a central part to play in the financing of young, innovation-intensive companies 
with the ability to become the world leaders of tomorrow. This report demonstrates that there is a 
role for government-backed ‘hybrid’ venture capital schemes to help reach those young businesses 
that have difficulty accessing funds from purely private investors. 
Insufficient fund size and the restrictions on the size and location of investments limit the ability 
of these funds to generate commercial returns. Placing geographical constraints on funds restricts 
them from pursuing attractive investment opportunities outside narrowly defined boundaries. 
Increasing the size of ‘hybrid’ funds to a minimum of £50 million would provide a greater number 
of investee companies with the resources and support to develop their businesses through to 
exit. It would also enable funds to invest in more high-growth companies and achieve greater 
diversification. 
Similarly, the short-term focus on filling narrow funding gaps can stifle a company by forcing it to 
undertake a costly search for much-needed follow-on funding when it reaches a ‘prohibited’ size. 
The tension between regional and industrial policy is another challenge which must be met with a 
more flexible, bottom-up approach.
Initiatives in the UK have, in some instances, produced commendable results. The challenge now 
is for policy to evolve to take into account the limitations identified in this report and help the 
industry reach a critical mass. The establishment of a successful early-stage funding environment 
in the United States, via government interventions, shows what can be achieved. The opportunities 
in the UK are enormous and we must ensure the right framework is in place to capitalise on these 
opportunities if we are to produce more innovative, world-leading, high-growth companies. 
Jonathan Kestenbaum   Simon Walker 
Chief Executive, NESTA    Chief Executive, BVCA
September, 2009
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Executive summary
‘Hybrid’ venture capital schemes backed by 
both private and public sector funding play an 
increasingly important role in the risk capital 
funding of early-stage firms with the potential 
for significant growth. We analysed the impact 
of investment from six UK government-backed 
venture capital schemes on 782 funded firms 
over the period 1995-2008. The six schemes 
that are the focus of this analysis are the 
Enterprise Capital Funds (ECFs); Early Growth 
Funds (EGFs); Regional Venture Capital Funds 
(RVCFs); Scottish Enterprise-backed Funds; 
University Challenge Funds (UCFs); and Welsh 
Hybrid Funds. The key findings of the analysis 
are as follows:
These schemes have had a positive impact 
on firm performance, when compared to a 
matched control sample. There is evidence that 
the more recent schemes have been structured 
in response to lessons learnt from the earlier 
schemes. However, the size of their impact 
remains small to date. 
The modest impact of these hybrid funds is 
open to both demand-side and supply-side 
interpretations. A demand-side perspective 
would suggest that the UK does not have a 
large group of high potential firms being held 
back by a lack of early-stage VC funding. In 
any economy, only a very small proportion 
of new firms will be capable of earning the 
exceptionally high returns sought by venture 
capital investors. An alternative, supply-
side interpretation of hybrid funds’ modest 
performance is that it reflects shortcomings 
in the investment decisions of some funds or 
the support they provide to investee firms. 
Venture capital is by definition ‘smart money’, 
and expertise matters as well as cash. However, 
such deficiencies might be attributable, at 
least in part, to the investment restrictions 
imposed on the schemes by their government 
sponsors. Depending on the programme, public 
co-investment has been conditional on funds 
investing in specific regions, or investing only 
limited amounts in any given business, all of 
which may compromise fund performance. 
The analysis could be taken to support both 
the supply- and the demand-side argument. 
What is not in question is that effective policy 
solutions have to address more than just the 
provision of a greater supply of finance: how 
this finance is provided and the number of 
venture-ready firms matter too. 
The analysis finds repeated encouraging 
evidence of firms that have received funding 
engaging in growth-oriented ‘equity 
investment’ behaviour. This involves firms 
undergoing disruptive changes while they 
build future capabilities. This produces an 
initial negative impact on firm performance 
compared to the matched sample of firms 
that did not receive venture capital funding. 
Firm performance then rebounds strongly over 
time as a result of the investments made. The 
analysis suggests it takes approximately 4-5 
years to turn performance around. This pattern 
is observed across a number of performance 
metrics.
The current ineffective capital market for 
young, high impact firms should not be seen 
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as exclusively a difficulty of either the supply 
of finance or the demand for finance. Rather, 
the central concern is better understood as 
that of a ‘thin market’ where limited numbers 
of investors and entrepreneurial growth firms 
within the economy have difficulty finding 
and contracting with each other at reasonable 
costs. Thick markets, characterised by high 
levels of repeated interaction between venture 
capital (VC) and high-growth firms, are 
needed to build human capital in the sector 
and provide a large enough market for an 
ecosystem of high quality advisors to develop 
specialising in supporting early-stage VC 
investment. 
To address this thin market, government 
policy needs to consider the simultaneity 
problem that occurs during the emergence 
and development of an effective VC industry. 
Simultaneity problems emerge because a viable 
VC industry requires its constituent parts to 
be working effectively together for extended 
periods of time in order to build human capital 
and investor confidence. These inter-related 
parts of an established venture capital industry 
include: 
•	Informed institutional investors (including 
pension funds, endowments etc.) willing 
to accept the risks of early-stage equity 
investment. 
•	A strong deal flow of attractive, high-
potential portfolio companies. 
•	Large professional venture capital funds of 
sufficient scale and managerial competence 
to make initial and follow-on investments 
and grow portfolio firms until attractive exit 
opportunities are identified. 
•	A supportive network of high quality 
advisors; and efficient and liquid exit 
markets. 
American experience suggests that such an 
emergent system is initially very fragile and 
needs decades of experience and public 
support to function effectively. Even the well-
established US venture capital system remains 
highly sensitive to economic shocks.
Compared to the US, the UK largely lacks 
large early-stage VC funds. Supporting 
earlier research work, the report 
recommends that early-stage venture 
capital funds should be substantially 
larger than they have been in the past. 
This would allow them to provide follow-on 
funding, diversify their investment portfolios 
and spread their high fixed costs. The viable 
size of an early-stage venture capital fund is 
a subject of intense debate. What is clearly 
known is that small early-stage funds (c. £20 
million) are vulnerable to commercial failure. 
It is suggested that VC fund sizes should be at 
least £50 million1 in order to realise minimum 
scale effects. Hybrid VC programmes supported 
by government funds have in the past been of 
insufficiently large size and as a consequence 
have reduced their probability of success.
Successful early-stage VC funds in the US 
require a strong deal flow of high potential 
firms in which to invest. This has allowed them 
to specialise by technology and build the 
technical and commercial knowledge required 
to identify, support and promote the rapid 
growth of world class, new technology-based 
young firms. Government policy should also 
recognise that this need for a strong deal 
flow creates a tension between regional and 
innovation policy. Outside Greater London and 
the South-East, VC funds constrained to invest 
by UK region are unlikely to have a sufficiently 
large enough pool of high-potential firms to 
be commercially viable. On the contrary, large, 
specialised and successful venture capital funds 
in the European Union focusing on innovative 
firms are increasingly likely to operate at a 
trans-continental or increasingly global scale. 
Public support conditions that keep publicly 
funded VC funds operating strictly within 
the currently recognised ‘funding gap’ 
also inhibit them operating in an effective 
commercial manner.2 Such conditions 
severely limit fund managers’ freedom to make 
follow-on investments. As a result, a fund’s 
ownership of an attractive growth company is 
heavily diluted in subsequent funding rounds, 
substantially reducing the original investors’ 
capital gain opportunities. The ‘drip feeding’ 
of funding means that high potential portfolio 
companies have their funding restricted during 
their periods of early growth unless alternative 
private investment is available. Fund managers 
also have fewer opportunities to learn how 
to help grow firms in ways that generate 
exceptional returns, in a comparable manner 
to the most successful private venture capital 
funds in the US or UK. The resulting system is 
neither growth nor success oriented.
Separate policies and programmes that 
focus exclusively on filling narrow funding 
gaps with the assistance of public money 
can be counter-productive as they can 
create artificial barriers between successive 
1. Murray, G. C. 1999. ‘Early-
stage, venture capital funds, 
scale economies and public 
support’, Venture Capital, 
1, (4) pp 351-384; Murray, 
G. C. and Marriott, R. 1998. 
‘Why has the investment 
performance of technology-
specialist, European venture 
capital funds been so poor?, 
Research Policy, 27, pp. 
947-76. 
2. It should be recognised 
that these constraints are 
not necessarily exclusively 
imposed by domestic 
governments. The need 
to meet the strictures of 
EC competition policy can 
markedly influence the scale 
of public funding that can be 
made available.
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rounds of funding. Such barriers are disruptive 
and costly (in time, money and managerial 
resources) for both venture capital investors 
and portfolio firms. Policy should be more 
systematic, focusing on improving the flow 
of multiple funding rounds to high potential 
young firms as they grow, thereby providing 
a ‘funding escalator’ from formation to IPO or 
trade sale. This is likely to involve both Business 
Angel (BA) and venture capital funding.
Improved support for Business Angel 
networks is encouraging, and is a good 
example of a ‘demand side’ policy that 
seeks to improve the flow of high-quality 
firms available to the VC sector. The Business 
Angel environment in the UK has evolved 
from a fragmented system of anonymous 
individuals to an increasingly co-ordinated 
network of professionally organised groups. 
The best Angel groups can now make sizeable 
initial investments and undertake appropriate 
follow-on investments in a manner that is 
as professional as equivalent venture capital 
investors. Improving the flow of high quality 
deals from such networks to venture capital 
funds should be a priority.
While the UK has not as yet produced a VC 
funding system focused on innovative and 
exceptional companies comparable with the 
best in the United States, the analysis does 
find encouraging evidence of change. Given 
that it took over 50 years of experimentation 
in the United States to produce the system in 
operation today, the speed at which the UK 
system is learning from policy experiments 
and improving should be recognised. The 
UK is increasingly well positioned to exploit 
improvements in the financing of high-
potential firms and there is good reason to 
expect more positive outcomes in the future. 
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7Definitions and distinctions
In this report we will frequently use the 
following terms: venture capital, private 
equity, risk capital, hybrid fund and early-
stage investment. These terms often mean 
different things to an American, a European, an 
investor or an entrepreneur, which can cause 
considerable confusion.3 Accordingly, when 
we refer to venture capital in this report, we 
will use the term as it is commonly understood 
in the USA:4 the process of external equity 
finance provision by professional investors in 
a new or young (i.e. early-stage) company to 
create new assets for the primary purpose of 
reaping substantial economic gain through 
an attractively priced market flotation (initial 
public offering) or trade sale.
Venture capitalists primarily invest equity in 
young companies in return for a significant 
part ownership of a business that they perceive 
has exceptional growth prospects. Venture 
capitalists are highly engaged and informed 
investors who provide substantial advice and 
governance to the entrepreneurial management 
team as they grow the company and move 
towards a successful exit. This ‘classic’ 
venture capital industry is largely focused on 
knowledge-based industries and accordingly 
typically has strong links to university and 
other research centres. Venture capitalists 
primarily invest in areas where technology and 
other innovations are being developed that 
have exceptional commercial potential because 
of their potentially disruptive effect on existing 
business practice and incumbent firms. 
As the UK industry has grown and matured, 
investors have often found it very difficult to 
replicate the successes of the US VC market 
when investing in early-stage companies. As a 
result, some prominent investors have moved 
to invest in larger, later stage businesses where 
the risks and uncertainties are less extreme. 
This has led to a hiatus in funding for the 
youngest companies which has been widely 
termed ‘the equity gap’. This gap is often 
seen as a market failure. If the affected firms 
genuinely have high potential, this gap would 
warrant public intervention to address and 
correct any under-investment. As a result, the 
State has been drawn into this market both as 
an alternative investor to venture capital firms, 
and as a co-investor with them. Arrangements 
where the state invests in a venture capital 
fund managed by a commercial venture 
capitalist are termed ‘hybrid’ VC funds.5 
This report does not address Private Equity 
(PE) investment or its primary interest in 
refinancing and restructuring of existing assets 
(rather than the creation of new assets). 
Governments very rarely intervene directly to 
promote or engage in PE, which has grown 
significantly to become an important and 
profitable activity in the UK. Private equity 
investing is largely focused on management 
buy-outs, buy-ins and other later stage 
development finance. Where the term is used it 
is primarily done so in order to make a specific 
comparison with venture capital activity. In 
the USA, the private equity industry is clearly 
separated from the VC industry. In Europe and 
elsewhere, venture capital and private equity 
activities are commonly intermingled and the 
terms are often used interchangeably (thereby 
often promoting confusion).
3. European Commission and 
the United States Department 
of Commerce International 
Trade Administration (2005) 
‘Working group on venture 
capital. Final report.’ Brussels: 
European Commission. 
4. Bygrave, W.D. and Timmons, 
J.A. (1992) ‘Venture 
Capital at the Crossroad.’ 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
Business School Press; 
and European Commission 
(2006) ‘Developing European 
private equity – report of the 
alternative investment expert 
group.’ Brussels: European 
Commission. 
5. OECD (2004) ‘Venture 
Capital: Trends and Policy 
Recommendations. Science 
Technology Industry.’ Paris: 
OECD.
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1. Introduction 
Venture capital is widely recognised to be a key 
driver of economic development in advanced 
economies and a major source of finance 
for innovative, high-growth firms and their 
entrepreneurial owner-managers.6 Venture 
capital investment in early-stage firms has 
been responsible for helping to create and grow 
many of today’s most iconic global technology 
companies including Intel, Apple, eBay, Google 
and Genentech.7 Perhaps less visibly, venture 
capital-backed firms have also made major 
contributions to the rapid commercialisation 
of advanced technologies in medicine and new 
materials. 
Unfortunately, the US’s dominant success in 
the commercialisation of new technologies 
has not been replicated to the same degree 
elsewhere. The UK has been successful in 
producing very competitive, high-tech start-
ups, many of which have subsequently been 
bought by foreign firms.8 However, it has 
largely failed to grow these enterprises into 
independent, global firms. Similarly, despite 
substantial investment, recent attempts 
to build high-tech clusters have produced 
disappointing results. This is a major policy 
concern and has focused policy attention on 
the provision of professional risk capital finance 
and management expertise.9 
Total UK venture capital investment is 
substantially below US levels, with individual 
firms receiving smaller amounts of funding 
than comparable US firms.10 Moreover, despite 
a substantial rise in the total amount of private 
equity available since the 1990s, financial 
institutions have generally not invested in 
early-stage VC funds in the UK. This relative 
lack of institutional commitment to VC 
(compared to the continued international 
support for UK private equity funds) makes it 
increasingly difficult to create early-stage VC 
funds and fund early-stage ventures.
This absence of commitment has in large part 
been because, with few exceptions, the returns 
to early-stage VC funds have been both low 
and erratic outside the USA.11 As a result, many 
commercially focused funds and their limited 
partner investors have moved into later stage 
investment, where returns have been higher 
and more persistent. This exodus has left a 
funding gap for young growth-oriented firms 
seeking risk capital investment in amounts 
beyond £250,000 that are too large for 
business angels but too small for a majority 
of venture capitalists. The emergence of this 
funding gap has drawn governments across the 
industrialised world into the direct provision of 
support for venture capital investing.12
The UK Government has been one of the most 
innovative in developing a range of such early-
stage, equity finance programmes.13 Previous 
research by Pierrakis and Mason14 has shown 
that these public co-investment policies (often 
termed ‘hybrid’ funds) now make up over 
half the early-stage investment (by number). 
Given that their importance is likely to grow if 
the credit crunch continues to reduce private 
investment in venture capital funds, it is 
important to understand how they operate. 
This report summarises the results of a 
research project exploring the impact of 
publicly financed support schemes on firm 
performance. The research aims to determine 
what policy lessons can be learned from 
existing support mechanisms when designing 
the next generation of ‘hybrid’ venture capital 
programmes. Rather than looking at relative 
10
6. Gompers, P. and Lerner, J. 
(2001) The Venture Capital 
Revolution. ‘Journal of 
Economic Perspectives.’ 15, 2, 
pp.145-168; Reynolds, P.D., 
Hay, M., Bygrave, W.D., Camp, 
S.M. and Autio, E. (2000) 
‘Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor: 2000 Executive 
Report.’ Kansas City: 
Kauffman Centre for 
Entrepreneurial Leadership.
7. Shane, S. (2008) ‘The 
illusions of entrepreneurship: 
the costly myths that 
entrepreneurs, investors and 
policy makers live by.’ New 
Haven: Yale University Press.
8. The fact that many UK high 
tech start ups are acquired by 
foreign firms is not necessarily 
a bad thing. The UK economy 
benefits substantially from an 
open, international market in 
technology. The issue is that 
the UK could probably benefit 
more if conditions were in 
place to make growing global 
technology firms easier.
9. For equivalent European 
policy concerns see European 
Commission (2006) 
‘Developing European 
private equity – report of the 
alternative investment expert 
group.’ Brussels: European 
Commission.
10. Bottazzi, L. and Da Rin, M. 
(2002) Venture capital in 
Europe and the financing 
of innovative companies. 
‘Economic Policy.’ 17 (34), 
pp.229-270.
11. Dantas, C., Rosa, M. 
and Raade, K. (2006) 
‘Profitability of venture 
capital investment in Europe 
and the United States.’ 
Economic Papers Number 
245. Brussels: European 
Commission, Directorate-
General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs.
12. Lerner, J. (1999) The 
Government as Venture 
Capitalist: the Long-Run 
Impact of the SBIR Program. 
‘Journal of Business.’ Vol. 
72(3), pp.285-318.
13. Almeida Capital (2005) ‘A 
mapping study of venture 
capital provision to SMEs 
in England.’ London: Small 
Business Service. 
14. Pierrakis, Y. and Mason, 
C. (2008) ‘Shifting sands: 
The changing nature of the 
early-stage venture capital 
market in the UK.’ London: 
NESTA.
levels of overall funding, which only measure 
inputs, we explore the transformational impact 
of public schemes on the recipient firms.15 We 
do this because the key policy concern is not 
aggregate levels of inputs, but how resources 
(inputs) are allocated to support activities 
that raise productivity. Economists have 
increasingly highlighted how little economic 
growth can be explained by the accumulation 
of inputs, such as physical capital. Instead, 
economic growth is driven by how effectively 
resources are allocated in the economy to 
more productive activities. This has focused 
policy attention on entrepreneurs and venture 
capitalists as economic actors who identify 
such opportunities and allocate financial and 
managerial resources to exceptionally high 
impact investments.16
Understanding how effectively current public 
policy can support this allocation of resources 
is important for two reasons. First, many of the 
schemes that are explored in this report were 
originally developed during the early-stages 
of the ‘technology bubble’ of the late 1990s, 
and were influenced by the New Economy 
thinking of the time. As a result, politicians 
underestimated the difficulties involved in 
rapidly building a viable, growth-focused VC 
industry and, in so doing, solving the funding 
problems of high-growth, high-impact firms. 
Future policymaking will need to be based on 
a more realistic understanding of risk equity 
provision. 
Secondly, given the current credit crunch, 
the funding of equity of all kinds is likely 
to change. The ready availability of cheap 
debt has been severely curtailed, and the 
rebalancing of investment portfolios after 
equities have fallen in value may reduce the 
funds going into private equity and venture 
capital. On the other hand, the recession has 
reduced the returns from many traditional asset 
classes. Institutional investors accustomed 
to high returns may look again at alternative 
investments if they offer some possibility of 
realising higher yields. Moreover, many firms 
with active revenue streams are turning to 
venture capital after being turned down by 
banks. The impact of these changes will be 
influenced by how effectively public policy can 
be developed and implemented. One of the 
aims of this report is to help in this process.
2. Venture capital: a short introduction
Despite the significant impact of venture 
capital as a source of funding for elite new 
businesses, it is not a well understood 
phenomenon. As noted earlier, we use an 
American definition that encompasses external 
professional investment in a new or young (i.e. 
early-stage) company to create new assets to 
reap substantial economic gain through an 
attractively priced flotation or trade sale. 
This type of financing has four distinctive 
features. First, because venture capital funding, 
unlike debt funding, transfers part of the 
ownership risk from the entrepreneur to the 
investor, it encourages venture capitalists to 
provide managerial support to entrepreneurs.17 
The most successful and experienced venture 
capital firms have considerable managerial 
expertise, and the transfer of this expertise 
can have a major influence on the success of 
their portfolio firms. The persistent superior 
performance of the top quartile VC funds 
highlights the importance of this human capital 
for portfolio firm success.18, 19 
Second, venture capital is highly selective. 
Because venture capital is a very costly form 
of finance with many failed or disappointing 
investments, VCs need to generate very 
high financial returns on their successful 
investments in order to be economically viable. 
As a result, only a small number of exceptional 
firms are likely to attract their attention. 
Approximately 3,000 US firms get venture 
capital investment each year, including 500 
start ups.20 Moreover, almost all these recipient 
firms are concentrated in a small number 
of high-growth industries focused on ICT, 
healthcare, information and now, increasingly 
in 2009, on clean technologies.21, 22 Venture 
capital is therefore a very specialised type of 
financing for a small and exceptional cadre of 
high-growth companies. Venture capital is small 
as a proportion of both the total investment in 
start-up firms (about 1.9 per cent in the US) 
and tiny as a percentage of the number of firms 
that receive investment. It is not a financial 
instrument appropriate for the vast majority of 
firms. This caveat is important when promoting 
venture capital as a policy instrument.
Third, the mixture of high skills and high 
selectivity mean the returns to investment 
are very highly skewed. The majority of all 
returns come from the top quartile of funds. 
In early-stage classic venture capital activity, 
a majority of investments in a portfolio will 
either fail or return (at best) a negligible net 
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15. While there is a long 
history in UK public policy 
of focusing on inputs, 
and particularly relative 
levels of investments in 
international comparisons, 
the key policy issue is 
how inputs are efficiently 
turned into outputs. Inputs 
may be easier to measure, 
compare and influence, 
but productivity is the 
more important issue as 
recognised by its priority in 
Government policy.
16. Audretsch, D.B., 
Bönte, W. et al. (2008) 
Entrepreneurship capital and 
its impact on knowledge 
diffusion and economic 
performance. ‘Journal of 
Business Venturing.’ 23(6), 
pp.687-698.
17. Sapienza, H., Manigart, 
S. and Vermeir, W. 
(1996) Venture capitalist 
governance and value added 
in four countries. ‘Journal of 
Business Venturing.’ 11(6), 
pp.439-469.
18. The recognition of the 
quality of key investment 
management is reflected 
in the means by which 
the VC firms seek to ‘lock 
in’ star performers by 
skewing rewards to the final 
distribution of the ‘carry’ 
(i.e. capital gain shared by 
the general partners) of the 
fund. To acquire a senior 
manager a new general 
partnership will have to 
literally buy the new hire out 
of his or her existing carry 
entitlement. This sum may 
amount to tens of millions 
of dollars in a top quartile 
fund.
19. Gompers, P. (1996) 
Grandstanding in the 
Venture Capital Industry. 
‘Journal of Financial 
Economics.’ 42, pp.133-156.
20. Shane, S. (2008) ‘The 
illusions of entrepreneurship: 
the costly myths that 
entrepreneurs, investors 
and policy makers live by.’ 
New Haven: Yale University 
Press. p.90.
21. Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 
(2009) ‘Global Trends in 
Venture Capital: 2009 
Report.’ New York: Deloitte.
22. Clean technology covers 
green, environmental and 
renewable technologies 
where there has been a large 
increase in US VC interest in 
recent years.
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present value when the time cost of money and 
an appropriate risk premium are computed.23 
Where attractive net returns are made by the 
fund, it is likely to result from the realisation 
of a small minority of exceptional investments 
within the portfolio. One consequence of this is 
that venture as an asset class shows extremely 
large variation in returns. Statements about 
the performance, funding, skill and structure of 
‘premiership’ funds are unlikely to apply to the 
average fund.
Fourth, venture capital has had a powerful and 
disproportionate impact on the US economy. 
As Shane24 notes: “since 1970, venture 
capitalists have funded an average of 820 new 
companies per year. These VC supported start 
ups – a tiny proportion of the more than two 
million attempted business entries every year 
– have created enormous economic impacts. 
By 2003, companies that had been backed 
by VC employed 10 million people, or 9.4 per 
cent of the private sector labour force, and 
generated $1.8 trillion in sales... In 2000, the 
2,180 publicly traded companies that had 
received venture capital backing between 1972 
and 2000 comprised 20 per cent of all public 
companies, 11 per cent of sales, 13 per cent 
of profits, 6 per cent of employees, and one 
third of total market value, a figure in excess of 
$2.7 trillion dollars... In short, a very significant 
proportion all of the value generated by start 
ups in the USA has comes from this handful 
of VC backed firms”. A well functioning VC 
funding system therefore generates substantial 
positive ‘spill over’ effects to the rest of the 
economy, despite its relatively small size, 
because of its role in allocating funding and 
managerial expertise.
The data on the importance of VC-backed firms 
to the US economy can be used to estimate 
what might be expected in the UK. If the US 
economy generates 600-800 VC-investable 
firms each year, the UK might be expected 
to generate 50-60 based on relative GDP 
(ignoring the lower levels of investment in 
research in the UK). If one assumes that one in 
ten of these firms might generate exceptional 
performance, the UK VC industry might be 
expected to generate five US-style large 
firms a year – or 50 firms in the last decade. 
Experience suggests the actual number is 
substantially less. This, in turn, suggests that 
the UK sector is underdeveloped and/or has 
constraints that are not faced by the US. 
3. Government policy to support 
venture capital investment
The disproportionate impact of VC-backed 
firms on the US economy is one reason why 
economists and policymakers are increasingly 
interested in the unique role of venture 
capitalists in allocating resources and expertise 
to that small percentage of high impact young 
ventures. Virtually every major economy has 
implemented initiatives to promote early-
stage venture capital.25 New knowledge-based 
firms are a particular focus of such financing 
initiatives. However, even in the United States, 
government programmes have provided about 
20-25 per cent of the total amount of money 
invested in early-stage technology firms. This 
sum is about equal to the total investments of 
‘business angels’ and about two to eight times 
the amount invested by private venture capital 
firms.26
However, finding the correct policies to 
support early-stage equity investment in 
highly speculative and nascent businesses 
is not easy and requires repeated cycles 
of experimentation and learning. The 
United States has taken over 50 years of 
experimentation to generate appropriate 
and effective forms of support. Even so, 
world class venture capital expertise in the 
USA is limited to a few clusters adjacent 
to the leading universities on the East and 
West coasts. Inevitably, many of the early 
policy interventions were of limited value. 
Public schemes that provided tax incentives 
were exploited for tax avoidance while other 
schemes were subject to partisan political 
control and accordingly saw finance diverted 
towards unproductive investments.27 The Small 
Business Investment Company scheme, the 
Advanced Technology Programme and the 
Small Business Innovation Research program, 
which are often seen as exemplars, have all 
suffered major operational problems which 
have resulted in either major programme 
changes or cancellation. 
The difficulties that Americans have had in 
getting their own support institutions to work 
suggest that it is unrealistic to expect US-style 
institutions to be easily transferable to other 
countries. The concept of ‘path dependency’ 
needs to be appreciated by policymakers.28 The 
US market also has many unique environmental 
features that cannot be taken for granted 
elsewhere. For example, it enjoys a pro-active 
industrial policy, levels of research funding 
larger than all other G7 countries combined, 
risk-receptive securities market regulations,29 
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large IT firms in Silicon Valley and beyond, and 
a large number of entrepreneurial and well-
informed early-stage investors. In addition, the 
US has a very well developed infrastructure of 
entrepreneurial education and training. They 
all contribute to making the US venture capital 
industry pre-eminent and distinctive. As a 
result, policymakers outside the US have had 
to experiment with bespoke policy measures 
within their own national contexts. 
While many governments initially established 
their own VC funds, these have been largely 
abandoned as investment decisions were 
distorted by political influence. Government 
officials typically lacked the capabilities 
required to assess and manage investment 
opportunities, and the funds themselves had 
the potential to ‘crowd out’ private sector 
investors. Today government policy in support 
of VC typically takes the form of capital 
participation in which the state invests as a 
special limited partner in a venture capital 
fund managed by a commercial venture 
capitalist.30 In such schemes, the state devolves 
the responsibility for commercial investment 
decisions to the private VC partner once the 
general focus, objective and distribution of 
incentives of the fund are negotiated and 
agreed with its public and private stakeholders. 
Examples of such schemes include the 
Australian Industry Investment Fund, the 
German High-tech Gründerfonds, the Israeli 
Yozma programme and the New Zealand 
Venture Investment Fund.31 Additionally, 
several hybrid schemes often involve some 
kind of downside protection against losses or 
upside leverage of private limited partners’ 
investments in order to address the low returns 
typically associated with the majority of early-
stage investment.32 These programmes rarely, 
however, address ‘demand side’ problems 
associated with the poorly developed quality 
of the firms that may be seeking investment 
or the lack of skills within the local VC industry 
needed to find, build and sell a profitable 
portfolio of firms.33 In a policy context, this is a 
crucial omission.
4. A short history of hybrid funding 
schemes in the UK
The UK government has developed a range 
of ‘hybrid’ VC funds designed to pursue 
entrepreneurial policy objectives. These policy 
experiments focus on a “small but important 
minority of innovative, growth orientated 
business that continue to have difficulties 
in attracting funding, particularly between 
£250,000 and £2 million”.34 On government 
assumptions, equity investment in this range 
would be attractive to between 6,000 and 
12,000 firms which do not get funding each 
year.35 While appreciating that many of these 
firms will be unsuitable for venture capital 
funding, early-stage venture capital still 
appears to be underused by firms which would 
benefit from such access.36 
The UK has had a long experience with such 
government interventions in the capital 
markets used by small and medium sized 
firms (SMEs), a tradition going back to the 
formation of the Industrial and Commercial 
Finance Corporation (ICFC) in 1945. Significant 
public policy attention continued to be given 
to small firm financing, in the Radcliffe report 
(1959),37 the Bolton Report (1971)38 and the 
Wilson Report (1980).39 However, the biggest 
changes started after the 1979 election 
with an increased emphasis by the Thatcher 
government on small entrepreneurial firms as 
underexploited sources of job creation and 
economic growth.40 By the 1983 election, the 
Conservative government had introduced 108 
policies, many of which focused on removing 
market failures and other funding constraints 
that prevented small firms contributing fully to 
UK growth and prosperity.41 
Just because firms have difficulty finding 
funding does not mean that a market failure 
exists or that government policy intervention 
would improve the situation. In a sophisticated, 
competitive market economy such as the UK, 
many firms will enter the market with little 
chance of success. Most of these firms will 
simply generate economic ‘churn’ and will 
either exit rapidly or displace similarly marginal 
firms. As a result, many firms seeking funding 
will be refused and many firms that are refused 
funding will fail. A perceived funding gap could 
therefore be the result of investors rationally 
assessing firms and deciding that they are not 
worth investing in given the levels of incurred 
risk. 
Government policies that encourage the 
market entry of such substandard firms are 
likely to be a waste of money.42 However, if 
significant numbers of high-potential firms are 
not receiving sufficient funding to maximise 
their efficient economic output, government 
intervention to address any under-investment 
or market failure would be warranted.43 This 
is particularly the case if funding problems 
constrain the growth of the very small number 
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of high-growth firms that could create jobs and 
drive significant economic growth.44 
A range of policy interventions was introduced 
in the early 1980s to resolve market failures in 
funding SMEs. These included the Small Firm 
Loan Guarantee Scheme (SFLGS) which has 
provided over 100,000 guarantees of almost 
£4 billion to over 90,000 eligible businesses. 
To support firms that are suitable for external 
equity funding, the Business Start up Scheme 
was introduced in 1981. The scheme was 
over complicated and liable to the sorts of 
tax avoidance abuses that plagued early US 
schemes. It was quickly superseded by the 
Business Expansion Scheme in 1983 which 
provided tax relief on investments in unquoted 
growth oriented companies. While the scheme 
provided much needed investment around the 
£100,000 mark, much of the investment went 
into low risk, asset-backed enterprises. This 
was similar to the experience in equivalent US 
schemes, and was particularly the case after 
1988 when investments were permitted in 
private rented housing.
As a result, by the mid-1990s, a new wave of 
policy instruments was introduced. By luck or 
design, the Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS), 
the Venture Capital Trust (VCT) scheme and 
the formation of the Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM) introduced an implicit funding 
escalator going from a few hundred thousand 
pounds (EIS), to over £1 million (VCT), to tens 
of millions of pounds (AIM). 
EIS provides tax relief-based incentives for 
private investors (including business angels) 
to invest in small, higher risk unquoted 
companies.45 To address those retail investors 
who need to diversify their portfolio, the 
VCT scheme allows individuals to invest 
indirectly in a portfolio of companies through 
a professionally managed fund. Like the EIS 
scheme, VCTs qualify for a range of tax breaks 
and have been important in channelling equity 
investment into small firms and improving the 
liquidity of the AIM market.46 
When members of the research team evaluated 
the impact of the EIS and VCT schemes last 
year47 they found evidence of an increased 
rate of accumulation of fixed assets, an 
increased rate of job creation, and increased 
sales turnover. However, they also found that 
firms had lower profit margins and survival 
rates when compared to matched firms. 
These effects were statistically significant but 
small. Lower survival rates also included both 
voluntary exits and the acquisition of attractive 
enterprises by larger firms and so should not 
necessarily be interpreted negatively. Similarly, 
lower profit margins are also to be expected 
for schemes investing in young, growth-
orientated, and often pre-profit firms. 
5. The 1998 Competitiveness White 
Paper 
The New Labour government elected in 1997 
introduced a range of additional policies in 
the 1998 Competitiveness White Paper. These 
ideas had been developed during the start of 
the technology bubble of the late 1990s. As 
a result, they were heavily influenced by New 
Economy thinking that the basis of competition 
had changed and was increasingly driven by 
knowledge and intangible assets. Since firms 
based on intangible intellectual assets have 
less collateral to put up for loans, they are 
particularly suitable for equity investments.48 
Firms based on intangible assets also often 
have a combination of higher initial costs (for 
research and product development), and lower 
production and distribution costs compared to 
traditional Old Economy firms (e.g. software 
versus automobiles). These characteristics make 
them more likely to seek VC funding as they 
require more early-stage funding than they 
can generate through sales. They often have 
the opportunity to exploit powerful network-
effects once sales start to be generated (for 
example, by using the internet for distribution 
or marketing).
As a result, the White Paper had a substantial 
focus on supporting venture capital provision 
throughout the UK. It announced the 
formation of a £270 million Enterprise Fund 
working in partnership with the private sector 
to address market weaknesses through the 
SFLGS, Regional Enterprise Funds, a UK High 
Tech Fund of Funds, and an Early Growth 
Fund. A fifth element involving attention 
to Investment Readiness was added later 
following academic criticisms.49 These policy 
interventions were justified on the belief in the 
existence of a “market failure in the provision 
of finance in amounts below £500,000 for 
SMEs with growth aspirations”.50
The funds had three objectives: first, to 
increase the amount of equity finance to 
growing SMEs; second, to ensure the nine 
English regions and their local firms had access 
to local smaller scale equity investors; and 
third, to “demonstrate to potential investors in 
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early-stage venture capital funds that robust 
returns can be made by funds investing in the 
equity gap, thereby promoting the private 
sector venture capital industry”.51 At the time, 
it was widely believed by politicians that an 
initial investment would ‘pump prime’ the 
entire market. This belief was based on an 
erroneous view of the workings of the US 
venture capital industry and an assumption 
that the bull market for technology stocks was 
more substantial and long term than it turned 
out to be. 
An autonomous regional venture capital fund 
(RVCF) was set up in each of the nine English 
regions run by private VC general partnerships 
mandated to make commercial investments 
below £500,000 (later £660,000) with initial 
investments of up to £250,000. By 2006, 
the National Audit Office reported that the 
government had committed £74.4 million of 
public finance to the RVCFs which has amassed 
approximately £250 million funds under 
management.52, 53 
While the funds were commercially focused, 
the government recognised a market weakness 
that could be addressed by either a) subsidising 
management costs, b) providing guarantees 
for funds, or c) co-investing in funds to 
attract further investors. Returns to the 
public investors in these hybrid funds were 
either capped and/or ‘subordinated’, i.e. the 
public investor bore the first loss.54 However, 
subsidies weaken the exposure of fund 
managers to poor investment choices. Similarly, 
guarantees nullify the aim of demonstrating 
that institutional investors can make money 
in the equity gap.55 As a consequence, an 
equity enhancement structure was used that 
recognises government’s historic poor ability 
to make commercially successful investment 
decisions.56
Each fund typically raised 50 per cent of its 
money from the private sector with a further 
30 per cent from the former Department of 
Trade and Industry (now the Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills) and 20 per 
cent from the European Investment Fund. 
The schemes were delayed by European ‘State 
Aid’ concerns. However, following approval by 
the European Commission in June 2001 the 
first schemes were set up in January 2002, 
with seven set up by November 2002 and the 
remaining two launched in 2002-3. 
In addition to the RVCFs, a series of University 
Challenge Funds (UCFs) were co-funded by the 
government, the Wellcome Trust, the Gatsby 
Foundation and participating universities. They 
were intended to provide proof-of-technology 
and proof-of-market funding for the initial 
commercialisation of academic research. 
Nineteen funds were set up in total eventually 
covering more than 50 institutions.57 
The White Paper also established a High 
Technology Fund of Funds to provide equity 
to existing technology-focused VC funds to 
demonstrate that commercial returns were 
possible from investing in technology, and 
attract new institutional investment into 
technology-based firms. The initial investment 
of £20 million from the government was used 
to raise £106 million from institutional investors 
thus creating a £126 million fund-of-funds.
Lastly, the White Paper established Early 
Growth Funds (EGFs) to provide small 
amounts of equity finance based on angel 
co-investment, employing a quasi-equity 
approach. These investments are linked to 
business support to enhance the recipient 
firms’ chances of success. The EGFs were 
established to ensure that every English 
region has access to early growth funding of 
up to £100,000 per recipient firm.58 While the 
EGFs were originally intended to be regional, 
operational problems with the regional focus 
of the RVCFs meant that they evolved into a 
mixture of regional and national funds. 
Almost as soon as the schemes were set up, 
Mason and Harrison59 suggested they might 
have some design problems. The exclusive 
focus on the supply side failed to address 
the possibility that the lack of investment 
arose from a limited number of investment 
opportunities. As a consequence, subsidised 
funding ran the risk of driving existing private 
sector VC funds out of the market. They were 
also concerned about a lack of managerial 
talent as (a) only 17 prospective managers 
(two of whom withdrew) applied for the nine 
regional funds, (b) RDAs complained about 
a lack of competition, and (c) WM Enterprise 
and Yorkshire Fund Managers were selected to 
manage five of the nine funds.60 
Mason and Harrison61 also raised concerns 
that the funding gap had been misidentified 
because the government drew on misleading 
statistics that ignored the early-stage 
investment activities of Business Angels. Most 
Business Angels invest less than £100,000 
per firm, focused on the seed and start-up 
phases and regularly form organised groups 
of between 10 and 100 investors to invest 
over £250,000 per deal.62 As a consequence, 
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the gap in funding was less likely to be under 
£250,000, where informal but poorly co-
ordinated investments by BAs operate, than 
between £250,000 and £1 million.
6. More recent schemes
The Devolved Assemblies in the UK (Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland) also introduced 
their own equity support schemes using various 
kinds of matched funding and equity support 
measures. These are more varied than the 
schemes introduced in the White Paper and 
in some instances programmes (supported by 
additional European Commission finance) are 
able to make larger scale investments to attract 
firms to locate in specific regions. 
In particular, public sector venture capital has 
had a long history in Scotland which now has 
more VC-backed companies than the rest of 
the UK. The Scottish Development Agency, 
(the predecessor to Scottish Enterprise) was 
set up in 1975 with an explicit investment arm. 
Scottish Development Finance was established 
in 1981 to make venture capital investments, 
with Scottish Equity Partnership established in 
the early 1990s to invest in SMEs in response 
to what was perceived as a market failure in the 
supply of early-stage venture capital.63
The post-2000 technology crash prompted 
further state intervention, largely at the behest 
of the business angel community. This involved 
the creation of the Scottish Co-Investment 
Fund, launched in 2003 with financial support 
from the European Regional Development 
Fund. It invests alongside approved investment 
partners, most of which are angel groups. 
Any business that the investment partner has 
invested in that meets the scheme’s eligibility 
rules can raise matching funds up to £1 million. 
To date the fund has made approximately 300 
investments, investing £45 million alongside 
£95 million from the private sector.64
Later hybrid funds include the Enterprise 
Capital Funds (ECFs) developed following 
a 2003 consultation where respondents 
highlighted that while funding had improved, 
a small and significant number of firms still 
faced funding difficulties. The consultation led 
to a US style SBIC-type scheme to increase the 
flow of capital to growth-orientated businesses 
seeking up to £2 million of equity investment. 
The funds modify private investors’ (regulated 
fund managers’ and business angel syndicates’) 
risk-reward profiles and reduce the amount of 
capital they need to establish a viable fund. 
The government funds up to two thirds of the 
capital and addresses potential moral hazard 
issues by providing no downside protection. 
The government money acts as a loan that 
is repaid first, with 4.5 per cent interest. The 
scheme was investigated under EU state aid 
rules in May 2004 and gained Commission 
approval a year later in May 2005. 
Interestingly, there is no maximum size for 
the funds and constraints on the amount that 
they can invest in a single business are limited. 
The government will only commit £25 million 
to a single fund or no more than double the 
private investment. To constrain investment 
within the funding gap, ECFs cannot invest in 
initial funding rounds that exceed £2 million, 
and they cannot invest more than £2 million in 
total, except to reduce dilution of their equity 
stake (and even then they cannot invest more 
than 10 per cent of their fund). Since the 
average fund is approximately £26 million in 
size, this still restricts funding to relatively small 
amounts. The scheme has now moved into a 
third round and an additional £150 million was 
recently announced for the scheme.
One of the interesting organisational 
innovations with the ECF has been its semi-
privatisation of its operation. This is done 
through an arms length organisation Capital For 
Enterprise Limited, a company wholly owned by 
the Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills.65 The company acts as a consultancy and 
asset management business for the government 
and manages the loan guarantee schemes as 
well as hybrid VC programmes. The firm is a 
substantial investor in UK VC funds and its 
close connections to the government, together 
with its independence, enable it to avoid some 
of the conflicts of interest that plague public 
sector-run funds while still being responsive to 
government policy.
Given that many of the early schemes were 
developed during the technology bubble 
of the late 1990s (1997-2000) and were 
informed by New Economy ideas, it would be 
inappropriate to evaluate them solely on their 
original basis. Instead they will be evaluated 
against a) current academic understanding of 
the effective operation of hybrid VC funds, 
and b) the relative speed at which UK policy 
has improved compared to the 50 years it took 
the United States to build its own VC industry. 
Given the poor performance of similar schemes 
in other countries, a non-US comparison would 
set the performance bar too low. 
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57. The funds were set up in 
competitive rounds as policy 
experiments, with 15 seed 
funds set up in the first 
round in 1999 (£45m) and 
four more in the second 
round in 2001 (£15m). The 
funds themselves were small 
and varied in their investing 
approach. Eventually, the 
schemes were replaced 
by the University Higher 
Education Innovation 
Fund (HEIF). Interviewees 
suggested that these funds 
played important roles in 
helping to professionalise 
Universities’ interactions 
with the commercial world.
58. The first fund started in 
October 2002. By 2005, 
£5.3 million had been 
invested in 65 businesses 
and by the end of 2005, 107 
small businesses had been 
supported (NAO, 2006:25). 
By 2006, seven funds 
were operational and had 
invested nearly £16 million 
of public money matched by 
approximately £43.5 million 
of private sector money into 
136 businesses.
59. Mason, C.M. and Harrison, 
R.T. (2001) Investment 
Readiness: A Critique Of 
Government Proposals To 
Increase The Demand For 
Venture Capital. ‘Regional 
Studies.’ Vol. 34, pp.663-
668; Mason, C.M. and 
Harrison, R.T. (2003) Closing 
the Regional Equity Gap? A 
Critique of the Department 
of Trade and Industry’s 
Regional Venture Capital 
Funds Initiative. ‘Regional 
Studies.’ 1360-0591, 37:8, 
pp.855-868.
60. Ibid. p.862.
61. Ibid.
62. More than one in ten of 
the deals funded through 
BA networks in 2000-2001 
exceeded £250,000 (Mason, 
2002: Mason and Harrison, 
2003:863). 
63. It was established as a 15 
year limited partnership with 
funding from the European 
Investment Fund. In 1997 
the Scottish Technology 
Fund was established as 
a joint venture with 3i. 
In 2000 Scottish Equity 
Partners was re-established 
as an independent 
investment management 
company and now invests 
across the UK. Scotland’s 
support for business angels 
is also long-established 
with LINC Scotland being 
established in 1991.
64. Scottish Enterprise’s other 
funds have recently been 
repacked as co-investment 
funds. The Seed Fund will 
invest between £20,000 and 
£100,000 in businesses that 
have raised an equivalent 
amount from private sources 
(e.g. banks, angels). The 
Investment Fund invests 
between £0.5m and £2m 
on a co-investment basis 
in businesses that are 
sponsored by investors who 
have been approved as Deal 
Promoting Partners.
7. Econometric analysis 
This section presents the results of an 
econometric analysis of the effects of these 
strategic government interventions in the 
market for equity in smaller (particularly 
technology-driven) firms (please look in 
Appendix 2 for the full methodology). The 
interventions analysed are:
•	Enterprise Capital Funds (ECF)
•	Early Growth Funds (EGF)
•	Regional Venture Capital Funds (RVCF)
•	Scottish Enterprise Funds (SEF)
•	University Challenge Funds (UCF)
•	Welsh Hybrid Equity Funds (WF) 
The evaluation integrated a quantitative 
variance study, exploring how variations 
in firms’ inputs relate to variations in their 
outputs, and a qualitative process study 
examining the reasons for those variations. 
The inputs analysed include age, size, 
sector and funding type, while outputs are 
measured by standard accountancy variables 
including: trading performance (profitability 
and sales); capital structure (fixed assets, 
capital formation); factor utilisation (labour 
productivity); and survival. These were analysed 
as real, per capita and dynamic effects, as 
appropriate. The process study involved 20 
interviews conducted in the UK, California and 
Europe.66
The quantitative research had three primary 
aims:
•	to compare the performance of UK 
companies that have received funding 
through these programmes against the 
performance of similarly matched companies 
that have not received such funding;
•	to compare the performance of recipient 
companies dynamically before and after 
receiving initial investment; and 
•	to quantify the effects on business 
performance indicators of key variables 
including, for example, company age, size, 
sector and other controls.
The analysis involved applying robust 
econometric methods to a large panel dataset 
of 7,741 firms. These methods were used to 
compare funded firms (782 treated, 10.5 per 
cent of total) with an untreated, matched 
control sample. This is an extremely powerful 
method for unpicking spurious correlations 
and identifying the specific effects of policy 
interventions, while controlling for other 
variables. For example, a funded firm may have 
an increase in a given performance variable. 
However, this improved performance may be 
because the firm is in a particular sector, or is a 
particular size, or is at a particular investment 
stage. The econometric methods allow us to 
separate out (control for) these other effects 
and produce a robust quantitative estimate of 
the treatment’s effects alone.
The data covers the full sample of 782 firms 
backed by hybrid venture capital schemes 
found in the Library House data-base, a 
commercial dataset with comprehensive 
coverage of VC investments in the UK. This 
data was ‘cleaned’ by hand and then linked 
to financial information taken from the FAME 
database that provides standard accountancy 
variables taken from sampled firms’ accounts.67
7.1 General capacity building
One aim of equity investment schemes is to 
support general capacity building in firms that 
receive funding. This involves enhancing the 
resources that growth-oriented firms have at 
their disposal, whether capital for investment 
(proxied by net total assets per capita) or 
increasing the number and quality of their 
employees. While we lack data on the quality 
of employees, we can investigate increases in 
the number of employees and in capitalisation. 
When we compare the behaviour of funded 
firms through time against the control firms 
that were not funded by the schemes, we 
find that firms that received investment were 
characterised by a one-off upward shift in both 
employment and capitalisation. 
The econometric methods allow us to quantify 
the effects. This is important as it matters a 
lot whether the effects are small, medium or 
large. The actual number of additional jobs 
created by all the 782 recipient firms was 1,407 
more than would be expected without funding 
(or 1.8 extra jobs per firm). These findings 
suggest these schemes are better at producing 
employment than the EIS and VCT schemes.68 
Similarly, the scale of the capitalisation effect 
implies that ‘treatment’ (i.e. funded) firms 
have, on average, received £98,455.50 greater 
capitalisation than ‘untreated’ firms.69
It is possible to explore this behaviour in more 
detail. More fine grained analysis, using a 
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65.  BERR was subsumed 
into the Department for 
Business, Innovation and 
Skills in Spring 2009.
66. These involved both 
structured and semi-
structured methods. Roughly 
half were conducted by 
telephone and half face to 
face. A broad coverage of 
interviewees was sought and 
those interviewed included 
fund managers from the 
main schemes, government 
policymakers, entrepreneurs 
that have received hybrid 
funding, private VC 
managers from both very 
large EU funds and smaller 
technology specialists, 
consultants, business 
angels, investment advisors, 
alternative investment fund 
managers and analysts, 
university technology 
transfer officers. Interviews 
were used to inform the 
process study and were 
used to build and test the 
framework. The qualitative 
study was triangulated 
using the results of a 
small questionnaire on the 
behaviour of early stage VC 
investors. 
67. We are grateful to staff 
at BvDEP for their helpful 
support and assistance with 
data mining and collection.
68. The ‘treatment’ variable 
has a highly statistically 
significant and positive 
impact of employment (ln) 
with a coefficient of 0.587 
(z-stat = 5.81, P>z=0.0001). 
The equivalent coefficients 
are 0.35 for EIS and 0.65 for 
VCT using similar modelling 
techniques.
69. Our preferred, random 
effects model finds that the 
‘treatment’ variable is highly 
statistically significant and 
positive with a coefficient 
of 0.888 (z-stat = 4.95, 
P>z=0.0001).
growth specification model to investigate the 
time dynamics of this employment effect, 
reveals the curvi-linear relationship displayed in 
Figure 1. 
This result suggests that employment 
growth in treated firms is more rapid in the 
years immediately after their initial equity 
investment. The majority of this employment 
effect is achieved by the seventh year, 
though our data is restricted to ten years 
and therefore we cannot explore subsequent 
behaviour. These results may reflect the weaker 
performance of the earlier schemes and care 
must be taken in making wider generalisations. 
While the schemes overall produce a positive 
effect on employment and are likely to produce 
high quality jobs, the size of the effect is 
relatively small, suggesting that these schemes 
are a relatively expensive means of short-term 
job creation. 
The analysis also found that a number of 
controls had a statistically significant impact 
on capacity-building. Company size was 
negatively related to capital accumulation (but 
did not affect employment), manufacturing 
and construction firms had higher employment 
levels, and university spin-outs had both lower 
capitalisation (coefficient – 2.42, z-stat=-4.57) 
and employment when we control for age, 
sector, size and high-tech status. We also find 
that high-tech firms have higher net total 
assets per capita (coefficient .38).
7.2 Profitability
Another aim of the schemes was to illustrate 
to investors that commercial returns could be 
achieved by investing in the funding gap. While 
valuation data on privately held firms is difficult 
to obtain and information on the returns that 
funds have generated cannot be obtained 
until the funds have closed, we can analyse 
profitability as a proxy for value to assess 
performance. If the schemes were illustrating 
very strong US-style levels of returns we 
would expect to see disproportionately higher 
profits and profit margins among funded firms 
compared to the untreated control sample.
On average, however, the six examined 
schemes have little impact on profit margins 
(i.e. the treatment variable is not statistically 
significant). In the previous 2008 evaluation 
of the EIS and VCT schemes the profit margins 
were found to decrease for EIS backed firms 
(coefficient -5.18), while no effect was found 
for VCT-funded firms. Such findings are not 
compatible with the view that the simple 
provision of equity funding will generate US-
style VC performance. Nor it is compatible with 
the view that there is (was) a large untapped 
source of high potential firms in the UK that 
are only constrained from growing by a lack of 
funds at the levels funded by the schemes.
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Figure 1: The proportional impact of funding on changes in employment over time since 
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Average effects can be misleading, however. 
When we estimate profit margins using a more 
nuanced treatment variable, which allows for 
differential effects as time elapses, we reveal 
an interesting time dynamic in the ‘U shaped’ 
relationship (see figure 2).70 As figure 2 shows, 
there is a substantial, and immediate, collapse 
in gross profit margins by the sampled firms 
compared to the unfunded firms in the three 
years after receiving the initial investment. 
But, by the fourth year, gross profit margins 
have levelled out and by year six there is an 
equally dramatic increase in profit margins. 
This evidence is consistent with firms making 
a trade off between short-run growth and 
longer-term profit as they reconfigure and 
invest in new products, technologies and 
processes for future growth. Once these are all 
in place, firms are able rapidly to rebuild their 
profit margins. Such reconfiguring is likely to 
be especially important for new technology-
based firms where technology life cycles 
are short and the need to innovate existing 
products/services in order to maintain sales 
and to ward off competitors is high.71
These findings are consistent with a constraint 
on funding for firms seeking to undertake 
‘equity style’ behaviour. Government funding 
does have a statistically significant positive 
effect on firm behaviour and this behaviour 
follows the pattern it was intended to. While 
the limited data we have on the earliest funded 
firms makes it difficult to statistically estimate 
future performance, the strong upward trend in 
gross profit margins is encouraging. 
As with the previous models we also found 
that some controls were statistically significant. 
In particular, we find poorer profitability 
performance for university spin-outs (again) 
and larger firms, while service sectors were the 
most profitable. The size of the coefficient for 
university spin-outs impact on profit margins 
was very large and negative (-16.79, p. 
0.075).72
7.3 Labour productivity
A key economic role of US venture capital 
is the allocation of financial and managerial 
resources to help grow firms that will have 
a dramatic impact on productivity in the 
economy. When we compared the funded 
firms with the control sample we found 
that recipient firms do have higher average 
labour productivity (mean sales per employee 
measured in £’000s) than matched firms that 
did not receive funding from the schemes 
being evaluated. In the first instance, this was 
identified as a one-off, upward shift in per 
capita labour productivity for supported firms, 
over and above that achieved by unsupported 
firms. After controlling for other influences, in 
the ‘typical’ supported firm this would equate 
to £57,800 (sales per worker) in increased 
labour productivity. 
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70. This involves using a 
non-linear approach that 
incorporates both the 
natural log of time elapsed 
and its square to produce 
the ‘J curve’ in figure 2. To 
rule out the possibility that 
the improved performance 
is a ‘blip’ in an otherwise 
downward trend, we also 
estimated a cubic term and 
find that it is not statistically 
significant.
71. Burgel, O., Fier, A., Licht, 
G. And Murray, G.C. (2004) 
The Internationalization 
of Young High-Tech Firms. 
‘ZEW Economic Studies.’ 22. 
Mannheim: Physica-Verlag.
72. This former finding would 
support Lockett and Wright 
(2005) who find frequent 
limitations in the managerial 
capabilities of European 
technology transfer offices.
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This result (coefficient 0.37) is similar to the 
recent results of the evaluation of the EIS 
and VCT schemes73 where the coefficients 
were also positive and of a similar size (0.33) 
for EIS though larger for the VCT scheme 
(0.74).74 Again, using more subtle analysis 
we find evidence that the full effect is more 
nuanced with a decline in labour productivity 
immediately post-investment and a rebound 
around four years later with strong predicted 
growth thereafter. Again, such a pattern would 
support a trade-off between capacity building 
and short-term sales and profitability by 
innovative young firms.
8. Designing policy to support VC
Two findings stand out in our analysis 
(summarised in table 1). First, while we do find 
evidence of a selection effect (i.e. a change 
in behaviour and performance as a result of 
being funded by the schemes), the size of 
that effect to date is modest. This result is in 
line with our previous analysis of the EIS and 
VCT schemes. Subject to the caveats noted 
earlier, companies that are recipients of funding 
under one or more of the government hybrid 
funding schemes examined do not yet exhibit 
significantly better performance. This suggests 
that the UK does not posses an untapped 
resource of high potential firms whose (greater) 
performance will be unleashed by simply 
making available more equity finance within 
the ‘equity gap’. Moreover, it shows that the 
New Economy expectations that underpinned 
the development of government policy in the 
late 1990s were unrealistic. 
This has important implications. UK 
government support for equity investment 
has been justified in terms of a market failure. 
Specifically a market failure in the provision of 
equity finance within the funding gap. Policy 
has been based on the assumption that if 
funding is provided then high potential firms 
being held back by (only) a lack of funding 
will be able to achieve their full potential. 
The current solutions on offer have not (to 
date) produced the disproportionately higher 
performance firms seen in US VCs’ early-stage 
investment portfolios. Whatever problems UK 
firms have, they are more complex than a lack 
of funding alone.
Secondly, we do also find in more detailed 
analysis repeated and encouraging evidence 
of the kinds of growth-oriented behaviour 
that the schemes were intended to stimulate. 
The data show that firms engage in disruptive 
(asset development) behaviour that lowers 
short-term performance while generating 
longer-term improvements. Given that the 
results of this positive behaviour take many 
years to become apparent, early evaluations 
of schemes (with less than a decade or 
more of comparative data) may therefore 
produce misleadingly negative findings if the 
full consequences of the additional public-
supported investments have not yet been 
realised. 
This difference in the behaviour of funded 
firms and the control sample suggests that the 
supply of risk equity is constrained in some 
way. Two further pieces of evidence support 
the suggestions that this behaviour indicates 
a supply side problem. First, large numbers of 
portfolio firms received further funding from 
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73. Cowling, M., Bates, P., 
Jagger, N. and Murray, G. 
(2008) ‘Study of the impact 
of the Enterprise Investment 
Scheme (EIS) and Venture 
Capital Trusts (VCTs) on 
company performance.’ 
London: HMT.
74. Our preferred random effects 
model finds the ‘treatment’ 
variable is statistically 
significant (at the 10 per 
cent level) and positive with 
a coefficient of 0.368 (z-stat 
= 1.90, P>z=0.057).
Table 1: Results summary (random and fixed effects coefficients)
 (log) Real Sales (log) Real  (log) Real  (log) Employment Profit Margins 
 per Capita Profits  Operating  Capitalisation 
   per Capita  per Capita
 RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE
Treatment Variable 0.37* 0.48** 0.56 0.55 0.89** 0.94*** 0.59*** 0.59*** -0.55 -1.86
(log) Years since -0.87***  -1.07***  -0.33  -0.07  -23.43*** 
investment
Years since 52.75*  73.91**  85.31*  44.35  1976.37***
investment squared
(log) Size 0.03 -0.13*** -0.22*** -0.45*** -0.71*** -0.81***   -4.26*** -5.46***
private sector VC funds. Roughly a quarter 
of the sample of treated firms received a 
third round of funding (many of the hybrid 
schemes invested only in the first two rounds). 
This is very substantially higher than would 
be expected if these were typical firms, 
particularly given that the average age of the 
firms in the treated sample is only 4.1 years. 
Secondly, there is a threshold effect. Below a 
total investment threshold of approximately 
£1 million little effect is observed. Firms may 
be using these smaller sums of money as 
operating capital. Conversely, this limited effect 
may reflect that hybrid funds are competing 
with Business Angels at the levels where there 
is limited evidence of an existing lack of supply 
of funding. 
Together these findings suggest that rather 
than only a finance-gap problem that can be 
solved by simply filing the gap with public 
money, or only a demand side problem caused 
by poor quality firms, the UK suffers from a 
‘thin market’ in the provision of specialised 
venture capital funding and managerial 
expertise. ‘Thin markets’ occur when small 
numbers of high potential firms and small 
numbers of investors with the skills to help 
them grow find it difficult to find one another 
without incurring unacceptable transaction 
and/or search costs. As a result, firms complain 
about difficulties in getting funding while 
investors bemoan the difficulties in finding 
attractive portfolio firms. In a thin market both 
entrepreneurs and investors are telling the 
truth. Because thin markets make it difficult for 
the supply and demand for finance to match 
they reduce overall levels of investment.
Within such a system, simply adding more 
money is unlikely to be sufficient as an 
informed policy response. A number of other 
conditions also need to be put in place. Above 
all, there needs to be demand for funding from 
high quality firms. Without a steady stream 
of high potential ‘investment ready’ firms, 
additional investment is likely to be allocated 
to lower quality firms. Similarly increasing the 
‘demand side’ alone, for example, by producing 
more university spin-outs and start-ups, is 
unlikely to produce the impact on the economy 
seen in the US unless finance is available and 
there are experienced managers in the funds 
and firms able to grow them into high value 
assets. Other challenges include addressing 
the co-ordination problems that thin markets 
create between entrepreneurs and investors or 
resolving other constraints, including red tape 
and access to managerial labour markets, that 
prevent a firm growing fast enough to generate 
the high returns that investors require.
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75. It is important to note 
that the data used in this 
histogram is skewed to 
the portfolio firms of more 
recent funds. It would be 
expected that more firms 
receive multiple rounds of 
finance over the life of the 
fund.
Figure 3: Percentage of portfolio firms receiving different numbers of funding rounds75
30
20
10
0
50
60
40
1 2 3 4 5 6
Understanding how and why ‘thin markets’ 
occur, and what can be done to address 
them, requires us to understand why there 
are problems with both supply and demand. 
This requires attention to the simultaneity 
problems involved in operating a fragile, co-
ordinated VC funding system over long periods 
of time. The following sections integrate the 
results of this quantitative variance study with 
results of the qualitative process study. They 
show how the matching of the supply and 
demand of VC funding to firms depends on a 
complex organisational system that must work 
simultaneously for some time before it becomes 
effective. 
9. The venture capital system
The most important institution within the 
venture capital system are the VC funds. With 
such funds one thing is clear – scale matters. 
In general, early-stage VC funds below £25-30 
million generate poorer returns for investors.76 
The minimum size will be greater in funds 
specialising in sectors, such as biotech, where 
larger investments over longer periods are 
needed. While small funds often have limited 
resources to spend on finding, evaluating and 
supporting investee firms, their main problem 
lies in their inability to provide significant 
follow-on finance to successful companies. This 
results in their investment position and future 
returns being diluted by deeper pocketed co-
investors. If the further financing requirements 
of the portfolio company are large in relation 
to the fund’s size, this dilution process can be 
financially penal to the original investors in the 
fund.77
Small funds also have a number of other 
problems. They find it difficult to spread their 
risks widely across a number of portfolio firms 
which is problematic because the majority of 
the returns in a portfolio come from a small 
number of very high performance investments. 
In order to stand a good chance of capturing 
one of these investments a syndicated portfolio 
needs to have at least 8-10 investments, while 
a portfolio closer to 20-30 investments would 
more adequately spread their risks. Small funds 
therefore find it very difficult to spread their 
risks while making follow-on investments. 
Small funds are also disproportionately hurt by 
high fixed costs. This problem was dramatically 
highlighted in the operation of the EU Seed 
Capital Fund Scheme in the early 1990s, 
where the prevailing small fund size meant 
that a number of funds would exhaust their 
investment capital in less than five years even 
if they did not make any investments.78 Smaller 
funds are further disadvantaged because 
they often specialise in making earlier stage 
investments. While such immature enterprises 
often do not need large amounts of external 
finance initially, they are often more costly to 
manage and need to be nurtured over a long 
period before they can achieve an attractive 
market exit. 
Scale also influences the business models 
and paths of development that firms can use. 
Economic advantage comes from having a 
larger income, and that is a function of the 
scale of investment (funds under management) 
and average profitability.79 Accordingly, funds 
can adopt business models that either increase 
the size of investments for a given level of 
profitability or increase profitability for a given 
size of investment.80
The first business model focuses on increasing 
the total sum of funds under management 
with a corresponding increase in their average 
investment size over time. This allows funds 
to take advantages of the benefits of scale 
when managing the risks of equity investment. 
This acquisitive behaviour often leads to ‘style 
drift’ where funds move away from early-
stage investments towards larger, later stage, 
management buyout-related investments.81 
The dominant public policy concern in the 
UK regarding the financing of high-growth 
young firms has been that, as VC firms follow 
this strategy, they move out of early-stage 
investing. This ‘drift’ thereby creates a funding 
gap as early-stage activity is abandoned. 
However, in the United States, as individual 
VC funds get bigger they do not necessarily 
move out of early-stage investing in new 
technology. Rather they use the scale of their 
funds to make initial and repeated follow-on 
investments across a portfolio of interesting 
firms and technologies.82 The majority of 
successful seed activity in the US is undertaken 
by integrated venture capital funds, each 
managing in excess of a billion dollars.83 They 
do this because they adopt a second business 
model that involves increasing the profitability 
of investments. Accordingly, they attempt 
to make a number of extremely high return 
investments (often producing returns 20 or 
30 times their original investment) that are 
large enough to cover the costs of the majority 
of less successful investments or failures. 
This requires technically and commercially 
well-informed fund managers to become 
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76. Murray, G.C. and Marriott, 
R. (1998) Why has the 
Investment Performance 
of Technology-Specialist, 
European Venture 
Capital Funds been so 
Poor? ‘Research Policy.’ 
27, pp.947-976; and 
Jääskeläinen, M., Maula, 
M.V.J., and Murray, G. 
(2007) Profit Distribution 
and Compensation 
Structures in Publicly and 
Privately Funded Hybrid 
Venture Capital Funds. 
‘Research Policy.’ 36(7), 
pp.913-929.
77. In the United States ‘pay 
to play’ provisions in 
anti-dilution clauses can 
mean that investors who 
are unable to follow on into 
the next round of funding 
will see the value of their 
investment fall as new 
investors are able to buy in 
at a lower cost. 
78. Murray, G.C. and Marriott, 
R. (1998) Why has the 
Investment Performance 
of Technology-Specialist, 
European Venture Capital 
Funds been so Poor? 
‘Research Policy.’ 27, 
pp.947-976; Mason, C.M. 
and Harrison, R.T. (2003) 
Closing the Regional Equity 
Gap? A Critique of the 
Department of Trade and 
Industry’s Regional Venture 
Capital Funds Initiative. 
‘Regional Studies.’ 1360-
0591, 37:8, pp.855-868.
79. The general partners of 
a fund receive an annual 
income as a proportion 
of the funds under 
management as well as 
sharing in the capital gain 
(‘the carry’) of the overall 
fund. Ceteris paribus, a large 
fund is likely to increase 
their rewards from both 
sources of income.
80. Institutional investors prefer 
funds with well established 
and clear business models 
and corporate governance 
structures. These are often 
distorted by ‘multi-play’ 
investment strategies. 
81. Sohl, J.E. (2003) The private 
equity market in the USA: 
lessons from volatility. 
‘Venture Capital.’ 5 (1), 
pp.29-46; Bygrave, W.D. 
and Timmons, J.A. (1992) 
‘Venture Capital at the 
Crossroad.’ Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard Business School 
Press.
82. Dimov, D.P. and Murray, 
G.C. (2006) An examination 
of the incidence and scale 
of seed capital investments 
by venture capital firms, 
1962-2002. ‘Small Business 
Economics.’ 18(1–3), 
pp.13–40.
very actively involved in developing, growing 
and nurturing young firms. Their overriding 
objectives are to identify major technological 
opportunities, create new assets, and build 
them into outstanding portfolio firms that can 
be sold for substantial profit.84 
10. Business models and the VC system 
The decision of which business model to follow 
is influenced by idiosyncratic factors as well 
as by the current institutional and economic 
environments. Because the profitability-
focused business model is higher risk and 
more fragile, it requires several components 
of an overall financing system to be in place 
and to work in a co-ordinated fashion. When 
these components are not working together 
effectively, fund managers following a high-risk 
profitability-focused business model will be 
forced to default back to a lower risk, size-
focused business model. This was seen, for 
example, after institutional investors stopped 
investing in technology-focused VC funds after 
the losses of the dot.com bubble. 
The component parts of a functioning venture 
capital cycle include:
•	A steady stream of funding from investors 
prepared to take on the higher risks involved 
provided sufficient returns can be generated. 
•	A supply of high quality, high potential 
firms worthy of investment. The number 
of firms with high enough potential growth 
rates to generate the sorts of returns that 
VC funds seek is likely to be very small 
relative to the number of start-ups in an 
economy. However, the supply needs to 
be large enough to sustain an industry. 
Since firms following profitability-focused 
business models are typically specialised, 
they may require a larger pool of firms than 
generalist investors. These firms can be 
either concentrated in one place (like Silicon 
Valley) or spread over an entire continent. 
Such firms also need to be investment-ready. 
In this regard, Business Angels can play 
important roles by building high potential 
firms for VCs to take on and grow.
•	The availability of knowledgeable and well 
resourced venture capital firms which 
can effectively act as co-ordinating agents 
between investors and entrepreneurs. 
Venture capital funds act as the main nodes 
in the complex nexus of contracts that links 
the actors in the venture capital system 
together.85 They supply the skills and funding 
needed to create and grow viable firms. 
These skills are in very short supply but are 
essential for the system to work effectively. 
Since these skills are based on experience, 
this creates a ‘chicken and egg’ problem, 
as skills are needed to operate an effective 
funding system and an effective funding 
system is needed to provide the environment 
where skills can be built up. This is one 
reason why government support has been so 
important to human capital development in 
so many international VC industries. 
•	A supportive environment for high-
growth firms. This covers the institutional 
environment where firms operate and the 
combined expertise of the firm’s managers 
and the network of advisors and industry 
contacts that help growing firms. VC 
funds draw on an external (and expensive) 
infrastructure of lawyers, accountants and 
consultants. This critical information resource 
network is more difficult to sustain when 
markets are thin and demand reduced. As 
markets develop and thicken, improvements 
in this infrastructure can generate ‘increasing 
returns’ that support future investment by 
making subsequent investments easier and 
cheaper.
•	Finally, there need to be viable exit routes 
that will realise the value of investments and 
generate large enough returns for investors 
to justify the higher risks involved. A 
profitability-focused business model requires 
a choice of flourishing and liquid exit markets 
including both a stock market conducive to 
VC exits and a strong trade-sale market. 
When all the parts of this system are working 
effectively it can generate a self-sustainable 
cycle. Here, venture capital firms demonstrate 
high performance returns to institutional 
investors which reinvest in new venture capital 
funds that are deployed to the next wave of 
entrepreneurial innovations. This encourages 
entrepreneurs to build high potential firms 
and seek funding. The few firms that are then 
funded provide learning environments for 
their managers and VCs, helping to further 
strengthen the system.
However, the system can be very fragile as it 
suffers from ‘simultaneity problems’86 given 
that all the elements of the system must 
each be present and able to work together 
over long periods of time in order to sustain 
fragile, often complex, profitability-focused 
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investment strategies. Shocks to the system, 
such as the dot.com crash or the current global 
credit crunch that constrain investment and 
disrupt an orderly exit market can imperil 
its stability. Evidence of such disruption can 
presently be observed in the difficulties that 
even elite upper quartile US venture capital 
funds are having in generating high value 
exits in the current economic climate of 2009. 
This has profound effects on the costs of 
their investments, the time they are held, 
the performance of the funds, and – above 
all – the willingness of institutional investors 
to continue to support venture capital as an 
attractive asset class. 
In the UK, this system has not yet become self 
sustaining – hence the thin market problem. 
Much government policy has focused on 
supporting a steady stream of funding. But 
other, arguably more important, parts of the 
system, such as improving the specialised 
human capital of the industry and increasing 
the flow of high-growth potential firms, also 
need to be addressed. In assessing government 
policy, it is important to look at how policies 
contribute towards the effective operation of 
this system. The next section runs through the 
components of the system and assesses their 
impact. 
11. Assessing recent government policy 
11.1 Regional equity
When analysing the influence of geographic 
region on the distribution of funds, we found 
that with the exception of the South East, 
where levels of funding were higher, we do not 
find that regions have a statistically significant 
effect. This suggests the schemes have been 
effective in their intention to reduce regional 
inequalities in the provision of equity funding.
11.2 Funding 
Funding has some positive impacts. 
Interviewees suggest the clear signal that the 
policies send about the UK being a supportive 
environment for VC investment has encouraged 
confidence in the sector. The conditional 
linking of public money to private money and 
the specific early-stage focus of the schemes 
in activities poorly covered by the private 
sector, suggests that the schemes are not 
likely to have ‘crowded out’ private money. 
Similarly, the large number of investments 
that have received additional rounds of 
private VC funding (approximately 25 per cent 
received three or more rounds) suggests the 
schemes may provide important ‘certification’ 
information to private investors making follow 
on investments.
But the assumptions about funding were 
over-optimistic. It is also clear that the 
initial expectations by policymakers that 
these schemes would show the investment 
community that attractive risk-adjusted returns 
could be made from early-stage VC investments 
reflected a degree of over-optimism. The 
key challenge for early-stage VC in the 
UK continues to be the lack of investment 
caused by the poor returns generated by 
some though not all funds. In the dot.com 
bubble of the late 1990s it was assumed that 
institutional investors were badly informed 
and early-stage VC investment returns were 
consistently high. Hindsight suggests that 
the opposite is the case: investors are well 
informed and average returns are often low. 
However, averages can be very misleading. 
The returns from the top performing early-
stage funds operating in the UK (though not 
necessarily based in the UK) are high and 
such funds are often oversubscribed. The 
constraint on their expansion is not funding, 
as their investors would like to invest more. 
Instead, they are unable to expand because 
of human capital constraints in the industry 
and the structural difficulties of increasing the 
size of the partnerships. This again highlights 
the importance of building human capital in 
the sector and paying attention to the skewed 
distributions when designing policy.
Funds were also poorly targeted. Many 
funds were focused under £200,000 where 
they directly overlapped with the investments 
of Business Angels and Business Angel 
networks.87 At the time, investors at this level 
were complaining of too much money and not 
enough good firms to invest in.88 The threshold 
effects we pick up in our data, where we find 
no difference between the treated sample and 
the control sample for small levels of total 
investment, supports Mason’s concerns about 
the constraints on funding being at higher 
levels (between £250,000 and £1 million) than 
was thought when the policies were designed. 
Focusing on a single ‘funding gap’ may 
also miss the importance of multiple gaps. 
As firms grow, different sized tranches of 
finance are needed over time that may not be 
willingly funded by the market.89 Funding firms 
at the early-stage may resolve initial funding 
problems without addressing the greater 
need for an effective funding escalator to be 
available to all attractive, growth oriented 
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young firms. The end result may simply be to 
set firms up to fail at a later date.
Finally, in a world of skewed distributions, 
how and where funds are invested is 
often more important than how much is 
invested. Many similar schemes in other 
countries have had funding allocations 
influenced by political decision makers. As 
a result, investment decisions are distorted 
and performance has been poor. If funds are 
intended to generate commercial returns the 
historical record suggests funding decisions 
should be kept at arms length from politics. 
Here we also find encouraging evidence. The 
UK government has produced an innovative 
organisational arrangement for allocating 
funds by setting up Capital For Enterprise 
Limited. The creation of an arms-length public 
body staffed by both professional financial 
staff and ex-civil servants allows commercial 
decision making to take place without political 
interference while retaining government access 
to valuable knowledge. While it is too soon to 
evaluate CfEL, this initiative appears a timely 
and intelligent response to the problem of 
civil servants increasingly having to act as 
commercial fund managers in the governance 
of public investment in the hybrid VC funds. 
11.3 Large, well funded, knowledgeable VC 
funds
Hindsight also suggests that some of the 
earlier public supported VC focused support 
schemes were subscale. It was overly ambitious 
to expect some like the UCFs, to become self 
sustaining given their structural limitations. The 
average RVCF was £27 million, the average EGF 
just over £5 million, while the UCFs had just 
over £3 million each. The ECFs range in size 
from £10 million to £30 million with an average 
of £26 million. In each programme, the small 
size of the funds limits both their potential and 
their performance. However, lessons do appear 
to have been learnt. More recent funds tend 
to approach minimum levels of commercial 
viability. However, any deviations from this 
upward trend would be unwelcome.
Perhaps a bigger viability issue is the 
unintended consequences of constraining the 
funds’ investment strategy within the equity 
gap. For example, the RVCFs could only invest 
up to £660k, the EGFs up to £200k, the 
UCFs up to £200k. These severe constraints 
on the maximum size of investments to a 
single company can force funds to make 
more investments than can be effectively 
supported.90 Profitability-focused business 
models require VCs to be very actively involved 
in growing their portfolio firms. Constraints 
on this involvement hamper both the firm’s 
development and the accumulation of 
knowledge within the fund’s management 
team. More significantly, the inability to 
engage fully in larger follow-on funding means 
that small funds’ investments get further 
diluted in each subsequent investment round. 
Such constraints hamper performance and 
make it harder to demonstrate the commercial 
attractiveness of early-stage VC investments (a 
key government objective). 
11.4 High quality deal flow and human 
capital development
The small size of the impact of these funding 
schemes to date suggests ex post that many 
of the schemes invested in firms that were 
not of sufficient commercial potential. The 
RVCFs only invested in 48 of the first 2,680 
applications they received, further indicating 
major problems with the quality of deal-flow 
attracted by the programmes (Murray, 2008; 
Mason and Harrison 2003). While we find 
encouraging evidence of policy learning in 
the recognition of this problem91 the analysis 
suggests the key policy issue has been and 
remains how to generate more exceptionally 
high-potential firms.92 
Introducing policies to improve the quality 
of firms seeking funding could generate a 
bottomless pit of funding requests. This could 
be avoided by being extremely selective. For 
example, by only supporting firms with strong 
management teams with prior experience of 
successfully floating or selling a firm; investing 
in sectors where growth rates and innovative 
potential are higher; and only supporting 
entrepreneurs who have ‘good predictors’ 
of success, such as many years previous 
managerial experience in the same sector 
and proven entrepreneurial ability. Rigorous 
selection criteria are characteristic of all 
successful VC funds.
Ensuring a good ‘deal flow’ of such high-
quality firms is important as VCs learn how to 
operate a profitability-focused business model 
through experience. Much of this knowledge 
is technology or sector-specific and the most 
successful American investors specialise by 
sector, or in a few technology platforms within 
a sector. Specialisation, as noted above, 
narrows the pool from which firms can be 
selected while increasing the potential for 
informed selection practices. As a result, VC 
funds that are tied to a region are not only 
constrained in the number of high potential 
firms they can invest in, they are also drastically 
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constrained in their commercial ability to 
specialise by sector or technology. 
This lesson has been learnt quickly, and 
the Early Growth Funds that started shortly 
after the RVCFs have both a regional and 
national focus. This suggests there is a tension 
between regional policy and the need for 
technological or sectoral specialisation by 
commercially-focused VC funds. England’s 
nine Regional Development Authorities have 
entirely legitimate desires to have ready access 
to a local pool of venture capital. But such 
regional specialisation, outside areas where 
there is a very high concentration of suitable 
firms, is likely to produce venture capital 
funds that lack the specialised knowledge 
or opportunities that are needed to produce 
high performance investments. Business angel 
networks with their wider spectrum of investor 
preferences may be more suitable vehicles 
for a regional policy which is complementary 
to more nationally focused, specialist VC 
funds. Government co-funding is reported 
by interviewees to have played an important 
role in professionalising and supporting more 
organised regional business angel networks 
and training future generations of investment 
managers. 
11.5 A supportive environment for growing 
firms 
The UK has problems growing new assets into 
viable, high value firms of the sort produced 
by VCs in the United States. There are many 
reasons why this is difficult. Interviewees 
suggest that because government policy has 
focused on narrow funding gaps, it has missed 
the problems this generates for firms in sectors 
(such as biotechnology) that require repeated 
rounds of financing. As Figure 4 shows, when 
schemes are introduced to fill specific vertical 
gaps in funding, they also as a consequence 
introduce organisational barriers that firms 
need to cross as they grow and seek additional 
funding.93 
Subsequent funding events that require the 
search for new investors can have a disruptive 
effect on firm growth. They require firms to 
identify new funders, negotiate a sale of equity 
ownership and re-orientate the firm towards 
the next round of funding. Such institutional 
barriers can therefore create substantial costs 
and increase the time it takes to grow a viable 
firm. These barriers can have the consequence 
of reducing the firms’ final valuation, making 
a profit-focused business model more 
difficult to operate. Perhaps the largest 
cost of the existence of multiple schemes is 
the opportunity cost to the entrepreneur. 
For many high potential young firms, time 
and managerial resources are as important 
constraints as finance. The need to negotiate 
finance from a range of programmes over time 
is a cost not faced by entrepreneurs supported 
by the largest private funds.
11.6 High value exits and stable  
co-ordination 
The last area where environmental factors 
influence the viability of classic venture 
Figure 4: Organisational barriers to growth generated by vertical funding schemes
Founding
Friends
and Family
Business
Angels
Hybrid
VC
Hybrid
VC
Funding Rounds Hopefully Exit
Time
Private Sector
Venture Capital Etc.
Increasing
Financial
Requirements
27
capital business models relates to the ability 
to achieve high value exits. Under normal 
economic conditions, the UK has a very 
supportive market for trade sales, but lacks 
a VC-focused stock market comparable to 
NASDAQ. While AIM, the London Stock 
Exchange’s international market for smaller 
growing companies, does provide flotations, 
these are often viewed by growth oriented 
firms and their corporate advisers as a source 
of additional finance rather than as a final exit. 
At the moment, even this exit has been closed, 
something which threatens the stability of a 
system which is highly sensitive to the time 
cost of investment. Regardless of the means 
by which a VC fund is structured or financed, a 
serious constriction on the opportunity to exit 
individual investments via market flotations or 
trade sales is arguably the single biggest short 
run break on VC activity. It impacts profoundly 
on both fund raising and investment as was 
seen by US and UK VC activity in 2008-9.
12. Conclusion
A more sophisticated modelling exercise 
using data that will not be available for many 
years would be needed to analyse the full 
impact of these schemes. Our analysis has 
produced a number of encouraging findings 
and clear evidence of policy learning. It is 
particularly encouraging to note that because 
the majority of the data are drawn from the 
earlier (more constrained) schemes, one might 
expect superior performance from more recent 
schemes in future evaluations. This would 
reflect more informed government policy 
and greater hybrid VC fund management 
experience. 
The analysis found that the programmes’ 
funding had a clear impact on recipients firms’ 
performance over time when the treated firms 
were compared to control firms. The evidence 
from a range of standard accountancy metrics 
suggests that treated firms forgo immediate 
financial performance while capabilities 
and assets are built up to increase future 
competitiveness. The result of this capability 
building, a form of investment behaviour 
encouraged by VC investors, indicates that 
over time the treated firms have the potential 
to exceed the performance of matched firms 
which have not undertaken such investments. 
The robustness and longevity of the 
performance premium gained by the treated 
firms will not be able to be fully ascertained for 
a number of years because data do not exist at 
this time. 
The econometric modelling shows a turning 
point where the funded firms start to out-
perform the unfunded matched firms (this is 
schematically represented in Figure 5). While 
the performance results to date may appear 
modest, it is worth noting that it is common 
for independent econometric evaluations 
of government support schemes to find no 
tangible or material positive outcomes. In 
some instances programmes that have existed 
Figure 5: Comparative performance of treated and untreated firms through time
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for many years and have spent considerable 
amounts of public money generate negative 
impacts. That these hybrid schemes have 
shown a positive outcome over a relatively 
short period – let alone in many instances they 
have outperformed established schemes such 
as EIS – should be seen as substantive grounds 
for optimism.
All the same, the analysis and interviews 
do suggest that young UK firms face very 
real problems in raising equity finance for 
early-stage development. The analysis 
suggests that these difficulties are unlikely 
to be caused purely by a market failure in the 
supply of capital. Instead, the small overall 
selection effect and the equity style behaviour 
we find when firms are funded above a 
threshold, suggest there is a thin market in 
the simultaneous supply of critical resources 
including finance, managerial expertise (in both 
recipient firms and VC funds) and high-quality, 
investment-ready firms. 
Conceptualising the small-firm equity-
finance problem in terms of ‘thin markets’ 
would produce a more systemic framework 
for developing future entrepreneurial policy 
than only focusing on the supply of funding. 
This more holistic market perspective would 
draw attention to the simultaneity problems 
associated with building a funding system of 
many complex component parts. In doing so, 
it would address both demand and supply 
side problems (including issues of managerial 
expertise), whilst still allowing public policy 
to be justified in terms of market failure. In 
essence, the problem of thin markets and the 
simultaneity problem are the same – they both 
address a situation in which the co-ordination 
of supply and demand is made difficult because 
it is mediated in highly uncertain, complex 
markets comprised of a range of different 
institutions. Such markets are demanding 
because they are knowledge intensive and 
have to operate over long periods of time 
(10-year funding cycles) before clear results on 
performance are available.
Under such conditions, a key issue relates 
to the long time that is needed to build up 
managerial capabilities in both funds and firms. 
This suggests a shift in emphasis towards 
encouraging firm growth, (and building up the 
human capital needed to grow high impact 
firms in both VC funds and investee firms), 
rather than firm formation. The performance 
data cast severe doubt on the wisdom of 
unfocused policy to support greater firm 
foundation without paying attention to the 
quality of the firms and the quality of the 
support they can receive. This conclusion is not 
novel. A number of academic observers, for 
example Acs, Audretsch, Shane, Vivarelli and 
Storey and several others have argued the case 
for a revised policy focused on high potential 
firms rather than merely increasing the number 
of new start-ups. We know empirically and 
theoretically that most start-ups die quickly 
and have little net impact on the economy. 
Building on these findings, and after seeking 
both practitioner and academic feedback on 
the research via a series of workshops run 
at Cass Business School, a number of policy 
suggestions emerge.
Hybrid venture capital funds should be 
larger. Small funds are often unviable and 
have insufficient financial resources to cover 
their high fixed costs (especially expert 
management), diversify their portfolios or 
provide the follow-on funding to the most 
promising investments in their portfolios. 
Small funds are therefore very vulnerable 
to a dilution of limited partners’ investment 
returns. The minimum size of a fund is the 
subject of intense debate. However, circa £50 
million is probably the minimum size that 
can be expected to be viable. Early-stage VC 
funds and funds specialising in life sciences 
and clean tech should preferably be larger. 
Regardless, the fund should have sufficient 
scale to manage a fully diversified portfolio of 
investee firms (with at least 20 enterprises) 
and to take the minority of high performing 
firms in its portfolio through the several rounds 
of financing necessary for a successful IPO or 
trade sale exit.
Venture capital funds with a commercial 
focus need to be able to select their 
investments from a large pool of high 
quality firms. Constraining funds to invest 
in geographically mandated areas is likely 
to have a negative impact on the size of 
the pool of firms they can invest in. This will 
limit their ability to specialise and generate 
commercial returns. There is therefore a 
potential tension between regional policy and 
innovation policy. To constrain investment in 
new technologies to a sub-national focus, and 
outside international centres of excellence, 
is particularly problematic. Regions primarily 
defined by local historical identities and/or 
political administration are almost invariably 
too small to generate the number of high 
quality firms needed to ensure a fund can make 
attractive commercial returns. Successful VC 
funds are usually specialist and organised on an 
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increasingly international and even global basis. 
These long run commercial imperatives need 
to be accommodated rather than frustrated by 
policy interventions. 
The operational constraints that keep 
publicly funded VC funds operating within 
the ‘funding gap’ also generate significant 
costs. Many schemes constrain investment size 
and focus to ensure that government funds 
provide the small sums of risk capital that are 
not available from private VC funds. Constraints 
in investment size are imposed in order to 
ensure that the earliest and smallest tranches 
of finance remain available through public 
intervention. However, this attempt to stop 
hybrid VC funds drifting towards exclusively 
larger deals has a major cost. It prevents 
funds operating in a commercially effective 
manner and ‘following-on’ their investments 
in high potential portfolio companies through 
syndicating with later stage VC funds. This has 
a negative effect on the investee businesses, 
as a ‘drip feed’ of finance means that the 
entrepreneur’s time is spent searching for 
the next round of funding (that may not be 
available) rather than growing the business. 
These constraints imposed by the public 
funders of hybrid programmes might need to 
be less rigorously applied if business angel 
network investment activity was increased, 
thereby providing more supply at the earliest 
stages of external finance.
Policy that focuses on filling narrow funding 
gaps can be counter-productive. Policies 
that fill ‘vertical’ gaps in finance by the specific 
provision of funds that address different levels 
of investment (e.g. maximum investment 
levels per portfolio firm of £50,000; £250,000 
and £2 million) can create artificial barriers 
between successive funding schemes that 
force growing firms to undertake disruptive 
and costly changes in their search for new 
or additional investors. This constrains firm 
growth, particularly in highly competitive new 
or immature markets, and reduces investors’ 
returns. The onus of substantial transaction 
costs in dealing with multiple fund investors 
is not present for a portfolio firm that has the 
support of a sizeable commercial fund that 
can provide multiple financing rounds. Policy 
should focus on improving the flow of funding 
to high potential, growth oriented firms 
(through a ‘funding escalator’) as they move 
from formation to a successful market exit. 
The systemic approach to policymaking 
adopted by the UK government that 
encourages Business Angel networks and 
links entrepreneurship and innovation 
policy is a positive development. Business 
Angels play an increasingly important role in 
early-stage investment and have the potential 
to complement later stage VC investment. 
As with VC funds, their performance is highly 
skewed, but many are increasingly capable 
of building exceptional firms that can then 
be taken on by venture capitalists. The best 
Angel networks are now able to work directly 
with venture capitalists in order to provide 
a ‘funding ladder’ for high potential SMEs. 
Business Angel networks are often very local 
and highly ‘hands on’. Therefore, they have 
the potential to support regional development 
ambitions without compromising their own 
economic viability. 
While the UK has not yet produced an 
early-stage VC funding system comparable 
with the best available in the United States, 
we do find encouraging evidence of change. 
It was never realistic to expect the UK to 
produce a US-style system after just a decade 
of specific public intervention. Learning how to 
produce such a system comes from sustained 
long-term experimentation and experience. 
None the less, the UK has engaged in a range 
of innovative experiments. These initiatives 
should be recognised and commended. 
While the data clearly shows there are major 
problems, even some of the early schemes that 
were constrained from operating as commercial 
VC investors have generated encouraging 
equity-style behaviour in the firms they have 
funded. The rapid and effective policy changes 
that have occurred as a result of lessons learnt 
from these hybrid schemes suggests that 
there exists a growing body of professional 
knowledge and (crucially) experience in both 
the private and the public sectors. Therefore, 
we have good reason to expect more positive 
outcomes in the future from hybrid VC 
programmes. Our optimism is conditional and 
assumes such programmes have an economic/
commercial modus operandi and are focused 
on exceptional and internationally competitive 
technology, intellectual property, entrepreneurs 
and businesses without regional constraints. 
Appendix 1: Summary data on sampled firms by hybrid 
programme
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Table 2: Summary data on sampled firms by hybrid programme
 Multiple  
 funds 
Portfolio Firms Information involved Welsh Scottish UCF RVCF EGF ECF
Standard industrial classification:        
      Primary/mfg/construction 10.3 26.2 19.8 15.1 18.1 19.5 10.7 
      Service sector 89.7 73.8 80.2 84.9 81.9 80.5 89.3 
        Average
Median firm age (years from 4 3 3 4 2 2 3 3
incorporation to 1st equity investment)
High tech (per cent)  21.3 28.6 33.6 60.5 42.9 24.8 10.7 34.3
(i.e. Butchart definition)
Acquired  (per cent) 5.9 7.1 6.9 7.2 6.7 2.7 0 6.9
Out of Business (per cent) 5.9 9.5 9.2 11.8 9.3 8 14.3 10  
Mean equity total raised £m 5.4 0.52 4.47 0.43 0.28 3.28 1.48 4.17
(i.e. total funding package)
Median equity total raised (£m) 2.58 0.68 0.8 0.51 0.34 0.42 1.37 0.7
Mean no. of follow-on funding rounds 1.5 1.5 1.4 0.5 0.8 2 1 1.3
        
Appendix 2: Methodology
The control sample was matched to the treated 
firms by sector (measured by 1 and 4 digit 
Standard Industrial Classification codes) and 
by the date of incorporation (which matched 
age and employment levels). Approximately ten 
firms were taken as the control sample for each 
firm in the treated sample.94 The numbers are 
not exact as small modifications were made to 
ensure representative regional coverage. The 
10:1 control-to-treatment sample ratio was 
chosen to ensure a sufficiently large number 
of firms could be analysed to make the results 
statistically meaningful (i.e. approximately 
400 observations or higher). The number of 
observations is lower than the total sample size 
because of the problems of missing data that 
plague economic analysis of small firms.
The treated firms and controls together 
generated a rich dataset of 7,741 companies 
tracked over a maximum of 13 years (1995 
to 2008). The data starts before the first 
scheme was introduced in order to pick up 
the behaviour of firms before they received 
investment. Due to the higher prevalence 
of firms being born at, or around, the point 
of their first supported external equity 
investment, the majority of the data is 
concentrated between the years 2003-2008. 
The average age of firms is 4.1 years, the mean 
total investment is £4.1 million, which reflects 
a strong skew as the median total investment is 
£0.7 million.
The data from the six schemes are aggregated 
in order to conduct the analysis across a 
sufficient number of cases. While separate 
programmes, their similarities in terms of stage 
of investment financed, fund structures used 
and sought outcomes are sufficiently common 
to allow such an aggregation.95 
Our estimation techniques involve two 
different types of econometric model, each of 
which makes explicit and different assumptions 
about the world. The first are ‘Fixed Effect (FE) 
models’ where variables are assumed to be 
constant across years and vary only between 
companies. This provides estimates of firm-
specific differences and allows ‘before and 
after’ analysis of the impact of funding on 
firms. These methods control for any biases 
that might emerge if (higher quality) firms 
self-select, or are selected, into the funding 
schemes. 
The second type is ‘Random Effects (RE) 
models’, where variables are assumed to 
vary from year to year within companies. 
These models are used across the treated 
and untreated samples to explore more 
subtle changes through time. The empirical 
findings are robust across both types of model 
specifications. The same, or very similar, models 
and methods were used in this analysis as 
were used in the Cowling et al.96 analysis of 
the VCT and EIS schemes. This allows us to 
compare results across the different schemes 
using consistent methods. Full details of how 
the models were developed and their sensitivity 
analysis can be found in Cowling et al.97
It is pertinent to outline some caveats that 
must be borne in mind when considering our 
results and any sources of potential bias in the 
findings.
Due to the nature of the datasets used, the 
impact of other publicly supported schemes 
such as the Enterprise Investment Scheme 
(EIS) or Venture Capital Trusts (VCTs) which 
respondent companies may also have accessed 
at the same time as they accessed the hybrid 
schemes cannot be examined. We are however 
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94. The numbers are not exact 
as small modifications 
were made to ensure 
representative regional 
coverage.
95. Essentially, all the schemes 
seek to enable a significant 
increase in economic 
activity among the invested 
firms which will thereby 
allow the hybrid funds to 
achieve positive internal 
rates of return (and capital 
multiples) that will satisfy 
the risk adjusted investment 
expectations of the 
participating institutional, 
(i.e. commercial) investors 
participating in the 
schemes. From the public 
perspective, a net return 
on the government funds 
invested equivalent to 
the exchequer’s cost of 
capital once the benefits 
to the recipients portfolio 
firms have been realised 
is the totality of public 
rewards sought from the 
programmes.
96. This former finding would 
support Lockett and Wright 
(2005) who find frequent 
limitations in the managerial 
capabilities of European 
technology transfer offices.
97. Ibid.
able to analyse them in isolation using methods 
that allow a direct comparison across the 
schemes.
Again, due to the datasets used, many 
potentially important company characteristics 
are not available for inclusion in our analysis. 
For example, we have only limited data on 
the managerial experience and quality of the 
entrepreneurs and management teams involved 
in the firms in our sample. 
The company accounts data also have 
substantial variability in terms of missing 
data. Databases of small and medium sized 
enterprise accounting and financial data are 
particularly vulnerable to missing or inaccurate 
information. This means that generalising our 
results to a broader SME population should 
be done cautiously. Sensitivity analysis of 
the dataset used in the VCT-EIS evaluation 
suggested that missing data in the FAME 
dataset does not introduce systemic bias.
It is difficult to predict how these factors might 
bias the results or the likely direction of such 
bias. However, the study has some important 
advantages that support our overall confidence 
in the results.
First, the dataset is unique and uses recorded 
performance data which is often superior to 
survey-based, subjectively reported measures. 
It permits the examination of the absolute 
and relative effects of scheme funding across 
a reasonable number of observations through 
time. 
Second, our use of advanced panel data 
estimation techniques allows us to be more 
confident that our statistical estimates 
accurately represent the underlying 
relationships examined while addressing and 
controlling for unobservable company effects. 
Because the coefficients produced by the 
random effects and fixed effects models are 
very similar we can be confident that we have 
control for firm specific effects.
All the same, the results need to be interpreted 
carefully. Differences in performance between 
firms can take several years to become 
apparent even using large datasets and 
sophisticated econometric methods. As a 
result, the analysis is more informative about 
policies the further back in time we look. 
Ideally investment policies require a decade or 
more of data before they can be authoritatively 
evaluated. (It is acknowledged that this is 
an unrealistic scenario given the pressures of 
accountability on government.) This means, 
unfortunately, that there is a trade-off in any 
evaluation between what can be said about the 
long-term impact of an extant policy and the 
current relevance of information about older 
and sometimes terminated schemes. Thus, 
the results of the analysis of more recently 
introduced schemes are likely to present a 
more negative picture of performance than 
might be expected when they have completed 
the investment cycle.98 We know that in 
VC funding, the ‘J Curve’ effect means that 
negative performance results occur before the 
returns from realised investments improve fund 
performance.99
Different interpretations of the behaviour 
of the hybrid VC funding system will reveal 
themselves in the data in different ways. If the 
original New Economy rhetoric is true and the 
UK only suffers from a supply side problem 
in the provision of funding, we would expect 
the schemes to have a major impact on the 
performance of the firms that are funded. For 
example, we would expect to see substantially 
higher growth, employment or sales. This 
would not necessarily happen immediately, 
as firms would need time to invest their new 
resources, but we would expect to see major 
differences in performance. A more subtle 
view of the impact of funding would be that 
most firms that receive funding are likely to 
be poor performers, but some firms that have 
high potential will be unleashed by additional 
funding and we should see a small number of 
exceptionally high performing firms. However, 
if there is only a demand side problem, and 
the UK suffers from a lack of investment-
worthy firms, we would not expect to see 
much impact. A more complicated picture is an 
indication of more complicated problems.
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98. This is because human 
capital in the sector is likely 
to have improved, the 
average size of many of the 
funds has increased and 
parts of the UK economy 
(such as the University 
system) is now more VC-
friendly than it was in the 
late 1990s.
99. Burgel, O. (2000) UK.  
Venture Capital and Private 
Equity as an Asset Class 
for Institutional Investors, 
London, London Business 
School/BVCA.
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